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The embodied becoming of autism and 
childhood: a storytelling methodology 
  
Abstract: 
In this paper I explore a methodology of storytelling as a means of bringing together research 
around autism and childhood in a new way, as a site of the embodied becoming of autism and 
childhood. Through reflection on an ethnographic story of embodiment, the body is explored as 
a site of knowledge production that contests its dominantly storied subjectivation as a 
͚disoƌdeƌed͛ Đhild. “toƌǇtelliŶg is used to eǆpeƌiŵeŶt ǁith a liŶe of flight fƌoŵ the autistiĐ-child-
research assemblage in to new spaces of potential and possibility where the becomings of 
bodies within the collision of autism and childhood can be celebrated.  
 
 
In this paper I explore a methodology of storytelling as a means of bringing together research 
around autism and childhood in a new way, as a site of the embodied becoming of autism and 
childhood. It is situated within critical disability studies (McRuer, 2006; Davis, 2006b), an 
interdisciplinary field with aims of exposing and disrupting dominant a-political representations 
of disability (and disabled bodies) as inherently individual, fixed and problematic ways of being 
in the world. In a move away from the deterministic view of disabled bodies as problematic, 
dooƌs aƌe opeŶed to ͚thiŶkiŶg aďout ďodies͛ ;GoodleǇ, ϮϬϭϭ, ϭϰͿ iŶ ǁhiĐh the ͚;impaired) body 
has a histoƌǇ aŶd is as ŵuĐh a Đultuƌal pheŶoŵeŶoŶ as it is a ďiologiĐal eŶtitǇ͛ ;PateƌsoŶ & 
Hughes, 1999, 600). I share a story of a morning spent at a ballet class with Sophie, who lives in 
a space that is labelled with both childhood and autism. Sophie is five, she has a diagnosis of 
autism. She does not use language but is verbal. She goes to a special school where her mum 
says she is happy, and she used to attend an inclusive nursery where her mum says she was not 
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as happy. The nursery staff had a lot of problems with Sophie. She was described in a whole 
host of fiǆed aŶd ƌeduĐtiǀe ǁaǇs; ĐhalleŶgiŶg, diffiĐult, autistiĐ. “ophie͛s ŵuŵ suggested that I 
ǀisit “ophie͛s ďallet Đlass, a Đlass iŶ a ǀillage oŶ a “atuƌdaǇ ŵoƌŶiŶg iŶ a daŶĐe sĐhool.  
 
Within dominant discourses of autism studies, Sophie may be part of research as disembodied 
subject, as a participant with a cognitive impairment.  Curran (2013) reminds us that studies of 
disaďled ĐhildƌeŶ͛s iŵpaiƌŵeŶts oƌ deǀelopŵeŶt aƌe Ŷot studies of their childhood. Within 
dominant discourses of childhood studies however, Sophie would perhaps remain absent due 
to the normative demands for participation which she could not enact. Even within dominant 
disability studies, Sophie would be marginal in research interest due to her status as child 
(Connors and Stalker, 2007). Disabled children it seems enter a disembodied void in research 
somewhere between disability theory, because of their child status, and childhood because of 
their status as disabled (Kelly, 2010).  
 
Within this paper neither autism nor childhood are considered as fixed states or neutral objects 
but as biopolitical categories which are produced and re-produced by the discourses that 
circulate around their name (Goodley, 2014). As I will show, the dominant representations of 
autism and childhood (both materially and theoretically) collide and pull at each other in 
ƌeseaƌĐh ŵethodologies that leaǀes little ƌooŵ foƌ oŶe aŶotheƌ͛s eǆisteŶĐe. ͚...ŵodeƌŶ 
Đhildhood͛, ‘ose ;ϭϵϵϬͿ suggested, ͚...is the most intensively governed sector of personal 
eǆisteŶĐe͛ ;p.ϭϬͿ. Autisŵ is ŵost ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ Ŷaƌƌated iŶ the pƌeseŶt daǇ, gloďal Ŷoƌth, as a 
neurodevelopmental disorder with an individual demonstrating impairments in social 
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interaction, communication and flexibility of thought (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
The dominant discourse occupied by autism diagnosis is one of intervention, disorder and 
development towards an elusive gold-staŶdaƌd of ŶoƌŵalĐǇ ;Daǀis, ϭϵϵϱͿ; the ͚autistiĐ Đhild͛ is 
measured against (and continually fails to meet), narrow, normative developmental standards 
of appropriate social, communicative, age-appropriate behaviour. The governance of childhood 
that Rose (1990) speaks of is magnified when it is met with autism where pervasive notions of 
the disordered child in need of adult, expert, developmental intervention are perpetuated. 
 
The Study of Childhood 
The emergence of the new sociology of childhood in the 1990s brought about a paradigm shift 
in the study of children. This shift was monumental in its turn away from the positivist, natural 
sciences and towards the recognition of childhood as socially constructed and a worthy site for 
the exploration of identity, culture and agency (James and Prout, 1997). With its focus on the 
rights of the autonomous and agentive child there was a call for participation and co-
production of knowledge by children in research (Christensen, 2004); children were considered 
experts in their world. Research here was no longer carried out on the child but was produced 
in collaboration with the child (Alderson and Morrow, 2004; Clark and Moss, 2001). This 
progressive research agenda strove for the recognition of the diversity and non-universal 
experience of childhood and was undoubtedly hugely successful in redressing the positivist 
imbalance. However, as participatory methods with children developed, it became apparent 
that disabled children (in their diversity), who may enact their agency and autonomy in ways 
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that were not normatively visible, remained at the margins of such research (Watson, 2012). 
The beginnings of participatory methods were often framed around ableist conceptualisations 
of ͚paƌtiĐipatioŶ͛; the autoŶoŵous Đhild͛s ͚ǀoiĐe͛ ďeiŶg pƌedeteƌŵiŶed ďǇ a liteƌal ǀoiĐe oƌ 
observable social competeŶĐies ;Daǀis et al, ϮϬϬϴͿ. “ophie iŶ Ŷot deŵoŶstƌatiŶg heƌ ͚ǀoiĐe͛ 
through such means would remain marginal to, or excluded from, research which aimed 
recognise and value the diversity of childhood experience. Those critical of such exclusion of 
disabled ĐhildƌeŶ ĐhalleŶged ƌeseaƌĐheƌs to ƌeĐogŶise that eŶaĐtiŶg ͚ǀoiĐe͛ iŶ ŶoŶ-normative 
ways did not equate to not having anything to say (Beresford, 1997). In turning to a more 
critical conceptualisation of participation, the centring of ableist, normative markers of 
autonomy, agency and voice can be destabilised (Runswick-Cole and Curran, 2014; Watson, 
2012; Davis et al, 2008).  
 
Even Prout (2005), himself one of the founders of the new sociology of childhood suggests 
perhaps the study of childhood needs to move towards a more critical era. No longer, he 
suggests, is it necessary to present the study of childhood as dependent on a set of narrow 
dichotomies (for example biological determinism versus social constructionism).  His argument 
is that these claims, whilst necessary to carve the niche to emancipate the study of childhood 
from biological determinism now serve to divert attention from the complex spaces between 
such dichotomies (68). The future of childhood studies perhaps then, requires the recognition 
of the complex spaces of childhood and as such, methodologies which themselves allow for 
complexity and emergence to be central.  
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The Study of Autism  
The vast majority of methodologies still dominating the field of autism sit firmly within 
positivist, empirical paradigms and are owned and operated by those with legitimate autism 
knowledge; the scientists and medics, the studies of brains and biology. A review of the autism 
research landscape in the UK showed that of the £20.8 million of funding between 2007 and 
ϮϬϭϭ, £ϭϭ.ϲ ŵillioŶ ;ϱϲ%Ϳ ǁas speŶt oŶ ƌeseaƌĐh ǁithiŶ ͚BiologǇ, BƌaiŶ aŶd CogŶitioŶ͛, a fuƌtheƌ 
£ϯ.ϴ ŵillioŶ oŶ ͚TƌeatŵeŶts aŶd IŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs͛ aŶd £ϯ.ϭ ŵillioŶ oŶ ͚Causes͛ ;PelliĐaŶo et al., 
2013). Autism in the present day, global north, is most commonly described as a 
neurodevelopmental disorder affecting an individual's social communication, flexibility of 
thought and imaginative capacities (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  It is perhaps no 
wonder then that a body that is considered both child and autistic is notably absent in research 
methodology interest. There is an inherent tension between the two dominant research 
paradigms; the child in childhood studies is now an active, expert participant in research about 
their lives (James and Prout, 1997), whereas the autistic is a passive, disordered object who 
owes the expertise in their lives to the domain of biomedicine (Milton, 2014; Milton and 
Bracher, 2013). Where research of both autism and childhood does exist, it is most often within 
medical, developmental and psychological research literature, still firmly positioned as the 
disembodied objects of study and intervention and as passive and silent within the research 
process. Forging a path for considering a research agenda for the everyday lives of disabled 
children, Curran and Runswick-Cole ;ϮϬϭϯ; ϮϬϭϰͿ iŶǀite us to ĐoŶsideƌ hoǁ a disaďled ĐhildƌeŶ͛s 
childhood studies provides a different starting point away from the passive, disabled child as 
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the object of study, towards an ethics that ĐeŶtƌes the Đhild͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe at its heaƌt aŶd seeks 
out ĐhaŶge aŶd ĐhalleŶge to the peƌǀasiǀe Ŷoƌŵ Đast oǀeƌ disaďled ĐhildƌeŶ͛s liǀes. 
 
Methodology: ethnography and storytelling 
The methodology adopted in this paper is taken from a period of ethnographic fieldwork as 
part of my doctorate project which explores the everyday lives of children with a label of 
autism. I considered methodologies and practices that would create, produce and afford a 
counter-narrative to the dominant discourses discussed above. Over recent years narrative 
methodologies have been embraced within disability studies (Smith and Sparkes, 2007) 
following a variety of approaches; life stories (Goodley et al., 2004), auto-ethnography (Neville, 
2004), oral histories (French and Swain, 2006) to name a few. The re-presentation of my 
ethnographic fieldwork takes the form of a collection of stories of everyday lives. I use 
storytelling as a means of countering the dominant disembodied research paradigms of studies 
about children with a label of autism.  I consider the storying of the body to be central to the 
disruption and contribution to these paradigms in an attempt to understand autism and 
childhood beyond narrow biopolitical framings. 
 
Whilst striving towards a storytelling methodology which acknowledged the prolific field of 
narrative inquiry, Max, who is eight and part of my project, brought home the slippery ethical 
task at hand. 
When I asked Max to write a story with me, about whatever he wanted, something that 
told me about himself, he was at first reluctant, then nervous, and eventually refused. 
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Once he felt comfortable enough to share his objections it was clear that his 
unwillingness to participate was a caution that I should heed. His understanding of a 
story was something made-up. If the stoƌǇ ǁas goiŶg to ďe aďout hiŵ theŶ it ǁasŶ͛t 
made-up, ďeĐause he ǁas ƌeal, aŶd eƌgo, ǁhat eǀeƌ ǁe did togetheƌ ǁasŶ͛t a stoƌǇ. 
Perhaps, he suggested, what I was actually asking him to do was write an article, like in 
a newspaper. That told people real things about him. To Max, if he were to share with 
ŵe his ͚tƌuth͛ theŶ ǁhǇ dƌess it up as a ͚stoƌǇ͛? 
Maǆ͛s ĐautioŶ ƌeŵaiŶs ǁith ŵe iŶ the theoƌisiŶg aŶd ǁƌitiŶg of these ƌeseaƌĐh ͚stoƌies͛. He 
provides a subtle reminder of the underpinning epistemological position of this project. The 
postmodern turn draws us to problematising both the collecting and repoƌtiŶg of ͚data͛ 
(Richardson, 2000) in a way that the study of autism (particularly in relation to childhood) does 
not traditionally afford. The postmodern crisis of representation has provided those driving 
ǁhat has ďeĐoŵe kŶoǁŶ as ͚alteƌŶatiǀe ethŶogƌaphies͛ ǁith ŵuĐh iŶ the ǁaǇ of food foƌ 
thought. The authoƌitǇ of ƌealist ideologǇ pulls haƌd toǁaƌds a Ŷeed to ďe ͚tƌue͛ to the oƌigiŶal 
story or experience of the individuals we study with (Clough, 1992). I indeed felt that 
authoritative and tempting pull before, and during my fieldwork and had much anxiety about 
appeaƌiŶg as a ͚ƌeal ƌeseaƌĐheƌ͛ ;WolĐott, ϭϵϵϵͿ ǁƌitiŶg aďout ǁhat ǁas ͚tƌue͛ aŶd ͚ƌeal͛ foƌ 
children like Max. The stories that I tell after my time spent with children are crafted within the 
sharing of the embodied worlds we enter in to in spaces of family homes, of school classrooms 
and of digging in allotments. I spend time with children and families in their homes, schools, 
allotŵeŶts aŶd paƌks. We talk oƌ doŶ͛t talk. We plaǇ oƌ doŶ͛t plaǇ. We eat, we think, we make 
thiŶgs, ǁe shaƌe thiŶgs, ǁe ďuild deŶs, dig gaƌdeŶs aŶd Đƌaft ŵeaŶiŶgs. Oƌ ǁe doŶ͛t. IŶ soŵe 
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senses, the stories are written in collaboration with the families, they would never have been 
written without them. In a practical sense, they are written by me. It is my fingers that tap at 
the keyboard and re-tell, re-cast and re-present whatever it is that we happened to do together 
that daǇ. I do Ŷot tell stoƌies iŶ the ͚ǀoiĐes͛ of ĐhildƌeŶ oƌ theiƌ faŵilies ďeĐause I ĐaŶŶot 
disguise my hand and ethically do not wish to do so. I narrate collective stories of my 
ethŶogƌaphiĐ ǁoƌk; ǁhat ‘oets aŶd GoedgeluĐk ;ϮϬϬϳͿ defiŶe as ͚taggiŶg aloŶg ǁith eaĐh 
otheƌ͛ ;ϴϱͿ. “ĐhǁaŶdt ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ĐoŶsideƌs this to ďe the ͚takiŶg ouƌselǀes aloŶg͛ ;ϯϲͿ iŶ effoƌt to 
make sense of the ethnographic experience.  This is far removed from a disinterested, realist 
methodological application but something that Walker (2001) feels should be celebrated by 
storytelling approaches; subjectivity and experience are recognised as powerful and 
compelling; there is room to experiment with creativity and fiction within academic research 
(Youdell and Armstrong, 2011; Banks and Banks, 1998). The stories are written as a form of 
inquiry and enact a creative analytics practice (Richardson, 2000) which aim to narrate due 
attention to the body as a site of lived, everyday experience. 
 
Criteria for ethnographic storytelling 
Bochner (2000) asks that those working within ethnographic approaches avoid a preoccupation 
with rigor, with a neglect of iŵagiŶatioŶ. ͚I ǁoŶdeƌ….͛, he asks, ͚ǁhat it is ǁe aƌe Ŷot talkiŶg 
about when we are talking about criteria? Instead of asking, how can this be true? we could 
ask, ǁhat if this ǁeƌe tƌue? What theŶ?͛ ;p.ϮϲϳͿ. AlloǁiŶg the stoƌǇiŶg of eǀeƌǇdaǇ liǀes to be 
measured by new criteria, in which writing itself becomes inquiry (Richardson, 1994), story-
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becomes-scholarship (Sparkes, 2000) and analysis happens within the story (Ellis, 2000) is the 
means by which my ethnography is brought to analytical life. My writing has become less about 
recording the data I had collected and more about creating a sense of place (Sikes, 2005) to 
invite my reader in to. The criteria of alternative ethnographies is my yardstick. Do my 
reflections, materialised through the stories, promote dialogue (Ellis and Bochner, 2000)? Do 
they express a reality - enacting a fleshed out, embodied sense of lived-experience (Richardson, 
2000)? Do they seek to nurture the imagination not kill it (Bochner, 2000)? Do I provide a view 
that complexifies the phenomenon (of autism and childhood) that has enough literary 
substance to provide a readable balance of chaos (Ellis, 2000)? I write against these new criteria 
and use my writing as inquiry, as an analytic tool to think with not just about the stories I tell 
(Ellis and Bochner, 2000). Situating my fieldwork within the frames of alternative ethnographies 
ďased oŶ ͚ŵoǀeŵeŶt, ĐoŵpleǆitǇ, kŶoǁiŶg aŶd Ŷot kŶoǁiŶg, aŶd ďeiŶg aŶd Ŷot ďeiŶg eǆposed 
;Wall, ϮϬϬϴ, ϰϭͿ takes ŵǇ suďseƋueŶt ǁƌitiŶg fƌoŵ ďeiŶg a ͚ƌeĐoƌd͛ of fieldǁoƌk toǁaƌds a 
continuation of fieldwork (Tedlock, 2000).  
 
In finding space to resist realist standards by applying new alternative ethnographic framings, I 
aŵ ƌeŵiŶded of BoĐhŶeƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϬͿ ĐautioŶ of the alluƌe of ͚Đƌiteƌia͛ iŶ geŶeƌal. EǀeŶ ͚alteƌŶatiǀe͛ 
Đƌiteƌia haǀe aŶ iŶheƌeŶt suďteǆt, ŵasked as soŵehoǁ ͚Ŷatuƌal͛ aŶd Ŷot soĐiallǇ pƌoduĐed aŶd 
always a means by which to measure certain representations of knowledge as somehow more 
or less legitimate or authoritative (p.269). The conclusion Bochner (2000) draws is taken 
forward within my subsequent story and analysis; not to get distracted by the desire to 
conform to re-written criteria but rather to maintain dialogue so that we can imagine better 
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ways of living together. Situating this approach within a phenomenological framing of lived 
experience allows for this dialogue to be storied through the everyday embodiment of the 
children and families within my project.  
 
Situating methodology in phenomenology 
A phenomenological framing of these shared, bodily, lived experiences allows for the 
recognition capacity of the body itself to be a 'source of self and society' (Goodley, 2011, 56). By 
moving away from Cartesian dualism in modernism in which the body is a passive, pre- cultural 
object, phenomenology allows us to talk about 'being and becoming'; the 'experienced and 
experiencing body', of lived experience (Paterson and Hughes, 1999, 600). Deleuze and 
Guattaƌi͛s ;ϭϵϴϳͿ ĐoŶĐepts of sŵooth aŶd stƌiated spaĐes ĐaŶ ďe helpful to ŵoǀe this aƌguŵeŶt 
foƌǁaƌd as ĐaŶ Butleƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϰͿ ǁƌitiŶg oŶ suďjeĐtiǀatioŶ. Butleƌ suggests that iŶ oƌdeƌ foƌ the 
suďjeĐt to ďe peƌfoƌŵatiǀelǇ foƌŵed ;iŶ this Đase, the ͚autistiĐ Đhild͛Ϳ, disĐouƌses Ŷeed to ďe 
produced in recognisable ways (2004, 5); the knowable autistic child who appears as both 
autistic and child. Deleuzoguattarian smooth and striated spaces however, take this subject 
beyond the individual and a singular space and in to an assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987).  If striated spaces are the disciplined spaces of hierarchy, binaries and normative 
meanings (Youdell and Armstrong, 2011) in which a body can be known and subjectivated as 
both child and autistic, smooth spaces then, are the spaces in between such biopolitical 
governance. Lines of flight are the ŵeaŶs ďǇ ǁhiĐh these stƌiatioŶs aƌe disƌupted, theǇ ͚...alloǁ 
us to trip out of the striations in which we are caught and skate on the smooth plateaus 
ďetǁeeŶ, eǀeŶ if iŶ doiŶg so ǁe slip iŶ to oƌ ďegiŶ to gƌiŶd out Ǉet aŶotheƌ stƌiatioŶ͛ ;Youdell 
11 
and Armstrong, 2011 p.145). These smooth spaces are spaces of becoming because they go 
beyond the knowable and appearing subjectivated autistic child and in to spaces of exploring 
the potential of what a body can do (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987).  A methodology which allows 
the body to be invoked in smooth and striated spaces offers the potential to explore what the 
body can do in such spaces beyond the governed, performatively formed subject. It allows us to 
recognise the ways in which children use their bodies to subvert despite the limits of the 
ďiopolitiĐal desĐƌiptioŶs of theiƌ eǀeƌǇdaǇ liǀes. It is the ŵeaŶs foƌ Maǆ to shaƌe his ͚tƌuths͛ of 
everyday life beyond his labels.  
 
German has more than one word for the body; the 'leib' describes a body of feeling, sensing 
aŶd ďodilǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐe ;CƌossleǇ, ϭϵϵϱͿ, aŶd ͚koƌpeƌ͛ the eǆteƌioƌ, oďjeĐtiǀe ďodǇ ;BeŶdeloǁ & 
Williaŵs, ϭϵϵϱͿ. WheŶ the ďodǇ ;iŶ spaĐes of autisŵ aŶd ĐhildhoodͿ is ĐoŶstituted as the ͚leiď͛ 
as oppose to the doŵiŶaŶtlǇ stoƌied ͚koƌpeƌ͛, it ďeĐoŵes possible to think about these bodies 
as sites of embodiment which if considered as a body 'worth living in' can give us the 
opportunity to revise how bodies can be lived in (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). In a 
phenomenological consideration of embodiment, this body is a worthy site of knowledge 
because it speaks of lived experience, which in phenomenological premise, is knowledge 
(Schutz, 1972). This gives us the arena to explore the stories I tell with parents and the lived, 
sensorial experience of children and ask what they can contribute to our knowledge of autism 
and childhoods. Through a focus on the body I aim to consider new possibilities for our analysis 
of such embodied everyday lives; to consider what they can offer to our potential to 
understand things otherwise outside of framings of cognition and disorder. I would suggest that 
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the stories themselves are the experimentation of lines of flight from the dominant 
disembodied autistic-child-research assemblage.  These stories themselves are an act of 
becoming in smooth spaces. 
 
A story of becoming, autism and childhood 
The becoming of this story affords attention to the body as a line of flight from the dominant 
disembodied autistic-child-research assemblage.  
It͛s eaƌlǇ oŶ a SatuƌdaǇ ŵoƌŶiŶg ǁith Đƌisp, ďƌight sunshine and a thick layer of 
iĐe oŶ ŵǇ ǁiŶdsĐƌeeŶ. I͛ŵ goiŶg to ďe late. I sĐƌape at the iĐe fuƌiouslǇ. The ďitteƌ 
air whips under my scarf as I get in to the car and my frozen hands stick to the 
steering wheel. Sat nav at the ready I set off out of the lazy, deserted roads of 
Sheffield and it to the wilderness of unknown Derbyshire villages. In 150 yards, I 
bare left. 
 
I arrive at the dance school in the nick of time and tentatively introduce myself to 
the first smiling face I see, in the hope that theǇ haǀe ƌeŵeŵďeƌed I͛ŵ ĐoŵiŶg. 
I͛ŵ iŶ luĐk, it͛s AŶŶa, the DaŶĐe SĐhool oǁŶeƌ. I͛ŵ ƋuiĐklǇ feƌƌǇed iŶ to a ǀast 
daŶĐe studio that has suĐh a Đhill I see ŵǇ ďƌeath. I͛ŵ offeƌed the seat Ŷeǆt to the 
burning hot electric heater which I need to enjoy while it lasts; it͛s sǁitĐhed off 
once the children arrive to stop prying fingers meeting a blistered fate.  
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In the distance of the changing rooms I hear the hum and giggles of small voices 
and parents wrestling with tutus. I play with my notebook and realise I have no 
idea ǁhat͛s ĐoŵiŶg Ŷeǆt. Hoǁ eǆĐitiŶg. I ǁoŶdeƌ if Sophie is alƌeadǇ heƌe, if heƌ 
ŵuŵ ǁas haǀiŶg a fight ǁith a tutu aŶd if Sophie is goiŶg to ďe haǀiŶg a ͚good 
daǇ oƌ a ďad daǇ, ǁe Ŷeǀeƌ kŶoǁ͛ like the daŶĐe teaĐheƌ foƌetold. She tells ŵe 
the new musiĐ hasŶ͛t ďeeŶ goiŶg doǁŶ too ǁell ǁith Sophie aŶd that the pƌop 
teddy bear had been drop-kicked across the room in recent weeks. 
 
Quite out of the ďlue I͛ŵ pulled ďaĐk iŶ to the ƌooŵ ďǇ a hush aŶd a stilliŶg of the 
distant scurrying feet. From a nostalgic ghettoblaster, a Disney classic (Aladdin!) 
rises from the depths. The room of the studio door is opened and three teenage 
girls corral and direct each girl, no older than four, a vision of pink, lycra and 
bounce, to their assigned seat on the floor in fƌoŶt of AŶŶa. Seaŵless. TheǇ͛ƌe 
ƌeŵiŶded of ͚tidǇ toes aŶd ďig sŵiles͛ aŶd folloǁ iŶstƌuĐtioŶs keeŶlǇ aŶd adeptlǇ.  
                       I sing along (word for word) in my head. 
 
Sophie is brought in last, guided by one of the older girls and led with enthusiasm 
and gusto to her spot on the floor. She watches Anna cautiously, through 
sideways glances whilst seeming thoroughly enthralled in the experience. The 
ŵusiĐ is loud. It͛s ĐoŶsuŵiŶg, filliŶg the laƌge spaĐe ǁith its ďooŵ aŶd iŶǀitatioŶ 
to get lost iŶ the DisŶeǇfiĐatioŶ of it all aŶd Sophie͛s ďought iŶ to it as ŵuĐh as I 
have. The music continues to crescendo and Sophie gets to her feet and whoops 
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aŶd shouts. This isŶ͛t the iŶstƌuĐtioŶs she should ďe folloǁiŶg ďut the teeŶage 
helper, acting as her shadow, and Anna too, seamlessly reorganise her space and 
she finds a new way to express her engagement with the experience, waving her 
hands and shaking her head, all the time whooping. 
 
A new girl, thinner and even smaller than the others arrives late and scurries to 
sit herself down next to Sophie. A sideways glance from Anna is all it takes for her 
to kŶoǁ this ŵight ŵakes Sophie uŶĐoŵfoƌtaďle. ͚We͛ƌe a ďit sƋuashed heƌe͛, 
Anna casually usheƌs, ͚let͛s ŵoǀe to heƌe͛ gestuƌiŶg to the otheƌ side of the ƌooŵ. 
This feels thoughtful, and easy and allows Sophie and the new girl their space to 
ďe iŶ the ǁaǇ theǇ Ŷeed to ďe. It͛s seaŵless. 
 
As the music continues, the helper becomes occasionally overwhelmed by 
Sophie͛s ďodǇ as it ďolts aĐƌoss the ƌooŵ oƌ spiŶs ƋuiĐklǇ aŶd uŶsteadilǇ, floppiŶg 
to the floor. Again, without fuss, Anna casually steps in, sweeping with the music 
aĐƌoss to Sophie͛s spaĐe. She seeŵs to ďe at ease ǁith AŶŶa͛s pƌeseŶĐe, her body, 
and allows Anna to dance along with her supporting and twirling her floppy body 
in a mutually acceptable way. 
 
Somewhere amongst this musical whirlwind, plastic wands have appeared and 
are used to direct the next phase of the girls performance. TheǇ͛ƌe eaĐh giǀeŶ the 
oppoƌtuŶitǇ to solo iŶ fƌoŶt of the ŵiƌƌoƌ, ͚sǁaǇ, sǁaǇ, sǁaǇ aŶd 
tuuuuuuuuuuƌŶ͛, tiŶǇ feet teeteƌiŶg aŶd stuŵďliŶg ǁith a ǀague ƌeseŵďlaŶĐe to 
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360 degrees; Sophie accepts the direction of her body and the regulation of her 
movement happily. 
 
The rest of the class passes in a blur of Disney and a haze of pink. Adults (or 
teenagers) are always at hand for Sophie, for the other girls, to make sure she 
can join where she wants and roam free when she choses 
 
Conclusions: methodologies to contest a knowable body 
I draw here on the corpus of autism theory to demonstrate how this story can contest the 
descriptions of a body that is knowable as disordered. Within understandings of sensory 
processing complexities commonly associated with autism, is the notion of proprioception; the 
seŶse of ǁheƌe oŶe͛s ďodǇ is iŶ ƌelatioŶ to otheƌ ďodies aŶd oďjeĐts. Theƌe is a Ŷod toǁaƌds the 
importance of the body in relation to research around autism but it seems to stop there, at a 
vague acknowledgement of sensorial abnormality or deficiency. The body as a sensory being 
can be a tricky one if you live in spaces labelled with autism because through the discourses 
that provide legitimate knowledge of what it means to be autistic - biomedicine - that sensory 
being becomes knowable. Most significantly, that being becomes knowable as sensorily 
abnormal and in turn, governable. The experiences of the body in relation to autism within the 
dominant discourse are accounted for by brain function, regulating, or failing to regulate 
sensory experiences. The body is tied up by the brain and is owned by it. This is a sticking point 
because it dictates that that the embodiment of autism is bound up in the realm of all things 
cognitive. These domaiŶs leaǀe little ƌooŵ foƌ aŶǇthiŶg ǀeƌǇ ͚eǆpeƌieŶĐed͛ at all aŶd aƌe faƌ 
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more concerned with the process of brain function and its consequences of subservient bodily 
function. 
 
We are haunted here by what the body is and is not, and what the mind is and is not, by the 
Cartesian call of disembodiment. If we draw boundaries around and between the body and 
ŵiŶd ǁhilst iŶsistiŶg oŶ a ďodǇ that is ultiŵatelǇ diĐtated ďǇ the ŵiŶd theŶ aŶ ͚autistiĐ ďodǇ͛, 
laďelled ďǇ aŶ ͚autistiĐ ŵiŶd͛, leaǀes little ƌooŵ foƌ ŵaŶoeuvre. Hickey-Moody (2009) speaks of 
this ŵaƌgiŶalisatioŶ of the ďodǇ as a pƌoduĐt of DesĐaƌtes͛ pushiŶg of ĐoƌpoƌealitǇ as ͚eǆteƌioƌ 
to the ƌealŵ of puƌe thought͛ ;ϯͿ.  As suĐh the ďodǇ is Ŷot a site of kŶoǁledge, it is ǁithout 
thought and is limited and uŶdeƌǀalued ďǇ ǀiƌtue of its ŵiŶd͛s ͚iŶtelleĐtual disaďilitǇ͛. Bƌaidotti 
(1996, 55 in Hickey-MoodǇ, ϮϬϬϵͿ iŵagiŶes the ďodǇ, its flesh, as the ͚sileŶt otheƌ͛ ǁhiĐh 
Spinoza (2001) would argue is in silence or deliberate silencing, not less powerful, but less well 
uŶdeƌstood. “piŶoza has us ďelieǀe that ouƌ ͚ŵiŶds aƌe the idea of ouƌ ďodies͛ ;HiĐkeǇ-Moody, 
ϮϬϬϵ, ϱͿ. This alteƌŶatiǀe leads us toǁaƌds the ͚thiŶkiŶg ďodǇ͛ ;ϲͿ; a ďodǇ is Ŷeitheƌ aďle oƌ 
disabled but is a process of becoming. When the limitations of Cartesian ideas are interrogated 
and the myth of the natural body uncovered (Butler, 1993), it becomes equally feasible to 
͚deŶatuƌalise iŵpaiƌŵeŶt͛ ;DoŶaldsoŶ, ϮϬϬϮ, p.ϭϭϮͿ. No loŶgeƌ is “ophie͛s ďodǇ a kŶoǁaďle 
entity of sensory abnormality, of cognitive disorder, but a being which produces and pushes at 
Cartesian ideas of what it means to know and live at the collision of autism and childhood. 
Within this becoming we are offered potential from the story of the Saturday morning ballet 
class and from the knowledge that Sophie and her body were producing in that smooth space. 
Sophie and her body subverted the limitations of the descriptions by which she was bound. 
17 
Let͛s ƌetuƌŶ to the ďallet Đlass to ĐoŶsideƌ the sites iŶ ďetǁeeŶ the ďodǇ aŶd ŵiŶd dualisŵ that 
allows us the space to explore this potential. 
 
From a layperson's perspective, ballet could perhaps be understood as a discipline by which I 
mean a regulated, controlled form in which one learns techniques, movements and processes 
for and with the body. It is very much a realm (again, understood as a layperson) of something 
ǁhiĐh oŶe ĐaŶ ďe ͚good͛ oƌ ͚ďad͛. I thiŶk ďaĐk to the haƌkiŶg ͚tidǇ toes͛ that ǁeƌe spatteƌed 
throughout that Saturday morning. Ballet requires disciplining in order to produce freedom; the 
ďodǇ ƌegulated as a ŵeaŶs to aŶ eŶds, the ďodǇ͛s foƌŵalisatioŶ aŶd pƌeĐisioŶ alloǁiŶg eǀeŶtual 
expression, I would theorise. In this sense then, Sophie could have been very easily bound up 
within the unruly
1
 realms of not being very good at ballet; her body did not conform to the 
discipline set out for it.  
 
I had previously listened to practitioners from her inclusive nursery setting describing Sophie 
aŶd heƌ ďodǇ, theiƌ desĐƌiptioŶs eŶĐapsulatiŶg heƌ ďeiŶg as ͚ĐhalleŶgiŶg͛. Naƌƌatiǀes of 
professioŶal eǆpeƌtise spoke of a Đhild ǁith ͚ĐhalleŶgiŶg ďehaǀiouƌ͛ ;EŵeƌsoŶ, ϮϬϬϭͿ. Those 
echoes rang dim on this Saturday morning. Should not her unruly body be invoked in much the 
same way by the ballet teacher here? Her body could surely be considered far more 
͚ĐhalleŶgiŶg͛ iŶ this spaĐe due to its disƌegaƌd foƌ the disĐipliŶe that is ďallet. But foƌ soŵe 
reason it was not. For some reason within a space that should, in theory, place much greater 
                                               
1
 I take ͚uŶƌulǇ͛ fƌoŵ Eƌeǀelles ;ϮϬϬϬͿ as the ďodǇ that does Ŷot adheƌe to, oƌ ŵeet huŵaŶist 
standards of the rational, contained, non-disabled body. I choose it for its theoretical 
associations and equally for what I feel the word and its sound connotates - movement, 
freedom, arms and legs everywhere - “ophie͛s ďodǇ iŶ that ŵoƌŶiŶg eŵďodied uŶƌuliŶess. 
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value on bodily conformity compared to an inclusive nursery promoting free-flow-play, Sophie 
and her body existed with far less regulation and discipline. This spaĐe ǁithout aŶ ͚iŶĐlusiǀe͛ 
ďƌaŶdiŶg oƌ ͚autisŵ speĐialist͛. Heƌe, “ophie aŶd heƌ ďodǇ ǁeƌe less ǁell kŶoǁŶ ;thƌough a leŶs 
of autism and childhood) and instead were producing knowledge, of becoming. Hickey-Moody 
;ϮϬϬϵͿ ĐoŶsideƌs, ͚hoǁ does oŶe Đƌeate a spaĐe ǁith aŶ atŵospheƌe that positiǀelǇ tƌaŶsfoƌŵs 
the ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh ďodies ĐaŶ ďe thought?͛ OŶe ŵight ďe ŵoƌe iŶĐliŶed to ďelieǀe that aŶ 
inclusive nursery would be more likely to achieve such an atmosphere than a Saturday morning 
dance class. However, it would seem that this dance class was a space that far more readily 
embodied transformative understandings of the body. This methodological approach with a 
focus on embodiment as a place of knowledge production and experience offers us a means of 
going beyond the traditional limits and boundaries of empirical methodologies which know and 
ŵeasuƌe “ophie Ŷot ďǇ heƌ ďodies pƌoduĐtioŶ, ďut thƌough heƌ ŵiŶd͛s disoƌdeƌ. In this dance 
class, the mind was not privileged over the body, neither autism nor child were privileged over 
the embodied experience of space; this was a space of becoming, of autism and child.  
 
By introducing notions of embodiment it becomes possible to get in between the divide; the 
body becomes both the source and the site of agency and not an entity in need of rationalising 
by the mind, and in turn, society (Csordas, 1993). Through engaging in ethnographic practices 
such as this, the stories that we tell of bodies, of autism and childhood, can maintain a 
phenomenological gaze through affording attention to descriptions of collective, sensorial, 
embodied encounters. By bringing together embodiment through ethnography and storytelling 
there is the possibility to create a spaces of becoming and potential; a becoming beyond the 
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subjectivation of autism and childhood. I have explored the beginnings of these possibilities 
within this paper and reflected on the potential for our understandings of the collision of autism 
and childhood through a methodology of storytelling. That storytelling has been used to 
experiment with a line of flight from the disembodied autistic-child-research assemblage in to 
new spaces  where the becomings of bodies within the collision of autism and childhood can be 
celebrated.  
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